












ABSTRACT: Epistemologists often appeal to the idea that a normative theory must 
provide useful, usable, guidance to argue for one normative epistemology over 
another. I argue that this is a mistake. Guidance considerations have no role to play 
in theory choice in epistemology. I show how this has implications for debates about 
the possibility and scope of epistemic dilemmas, the legitimacy of idealisation in 
Bayesian Epistemology, Uniqueness vs. Permissivism, sharp vs. mushy credences, 




§I. The Alleged Importance of Guidance 
 
 
Many epistemologists think that reflecting on the connection between 
normativity and guidance can help us to decide between competing views 
about the most general, fundamental, epistemic norms of belief – norms 
like: be rational; believe only truths; believe what your evidence supports, 
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and; believe only what you know.1 The idea is that these norms must be 
capable of giving us adequate (useful, usable, etc.) guidance, and that we 
should accept one set of norms, or one way of understanding that set of 
norms, over another on the grounds that the former, unlike the latter, 
meets this demand. 
 
In this article, I’ll argue that it is much harder to use guidance 
considerations to decide between competing views about the fundamental 
norms of belief than it is often thought.2 My approach will be to look in 
detail at a test case – a normative epistemology which appears to do very 
badly when it comes to giving useful, usable, guidance. I’ll argue that 
 
1 See, for instance, Pollock (1973), Ginet (1975), Goldman (1999), Wedgwood (2002, 2017), 
Langsam (2008), Gluer and Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013), Greco (2012, fc), Gibbons (2013), Way 
(2016), Kiesewetter (2017), Lord (2018), Sullivan-Bissett (2018), Fox (2019), Fassio & Gao (fc), 
Rinard (2018), Barnett (ms), and Neta (ms), amongst many others. 
2 On one way of interpreting ‘fundamental’, it is plausible that only ‘believe only truths’ and 
‘believe only what you know’ have a claim to being fundamental norms of belief. After all, 
insofar as one ought to be rational, or believe what one’s evidence supports, it is presumably 
because one ought to have true or knowledgeable beliefs. I mean to use ‘fundamental’ more 
broadly, to include all of these norms, which are very general in their scope, by comparison 
to local, contingent, norms like, say, ‘Don’t believe what they tell you on Fox News’. By 
‘competing views’, one thing I have in mind is the ongoing debate between epistemologists 
with internalist leanings and epistemologists with externalist leanings. Many in the 
internalist camp think guidance considerations show that you ought – are epistemically 
required – to be rational. Put another way: a belief is justified iff it is rational…truth and 
knowledge be damned (see Pollock, Ginet, Lord and Kiesewetter, for instance). Many 
externalists, by contrast, think that truth and knowledge are what really matters, not 
rationality (e.g., Sutton (2005, 2007), Littlejohn (2013, fc), and Williamson (2013, fc)). On this 
view, a belief is justified iff it is knowledgeable, rationality be damned. It is this debate which 
I am primarily interested in here. However, there is another debate in which guidance 
considerations have played a role, which asks: in what sense, if any, is truth a constitutive 
norm of belief. Here the truth norm and the rationality norm typically aren’t taken to be 
competitors in the way internalists and externalists take them to be. Rather, the focus is on 
how belief and truth (and rationality) are related. I will also have some things to say about 




guidance considerations don’t rule it out. From this, I’ll argue, it follows 
that guidance considerations have a much smaller role (at best) to play in 
deciding between competing views about these norms than it is widely 
assumed. It also follows that they have little or no role to play in a number 
of other debates in epistemology, including debates about the legitimacy 
of idealisation in Bayesian Epistemology; Uniqueness vs. Permissivism; 
and sharp vs. mushy credences. 
 
As we will see, over the course of the discussion a pattern will emerge. 
Some conceptions of adequate guidance are more demanding than others. 
The demanding conceptions cannot help us to decide between competing 
views because they are too demanding – if we accept them then we will 
have to admit that no normative epistemology is adequately guiding. If 
we accept less demanding conceptions of guidance, on the other hand, 
then every (sane!) normative epistemology will turn out to be adequately 
guiding. 
 
The plan is this. §2 presents a puzzle about epistemic normativity. §3 
presents a possible solution to it – this will be our test case. §4 describes a 
natural way of thinking about what adequate guidance must be if this 
view fails to provide it. §5 argues that this conception of adequate 
guidance is too strong for it to help us decide between competing views 
about the fundamental norms. In short, the problem is that if this is what 
adequate guidance amounts to, then no normative epistemology gives it. 
§6 looks at one obvious way of weakening our understanding of what 
constitutes adequate guidance in order to overcome the problem. §7 
argues that whilst this seems at first to do the trick, ultimately it still cannot 
help us to decide between competing views. §8 replies to some objections. 
§9-10 consider several other ways of thinking about guidance and argue 
that none of them does the job either. §11 discusses a variety of ways in 
which the point generalises to other debates about the norms of belief, 
including uniqueness vs. permissivism; sharp vs. mushy credences; 
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conflicts between substantive and structural norms of rational belief; and 
the demands of Bayesian probabilistic coherence. §12 concludes. 
 
 
§II. Conflicting Norms: A Puzzle 
 
 
On to the puzzle. It begins with two plausible-looking claims: 
 
 TRUTH: One ought (epistemically) to only believe truths 
  
RATIONALITY: One ought (epistemically) to be epistemically 
rational 
 
There’s plenty of scope for debate about how TRUTH and RATIONALITY 
should be interpreted, but it is hard to deny that each is true in some sense. 
Now consider the following case: 
 
BRUEGHEL: The Crucifixion, a painting by Pieter Brueghel the 
Younger, hangs in a church in a small town in Northern Italy. A 
gang of thieves intends to steal it. After weeks of planning, late 
one March night they quietly disable the church alarm system, 
break in through the apse door, snatch the painting from its frame, 
and make their escape. Back at the boss’s house, they celebrate; 
they expect to negotiate a large ransom from the government for 
its return. Meanwhile, the local police are also celebrating. After 
being tipped off about the thieves’ plan, they set up a hidden 
camera in the church and replaced the painting with an identical-
looking replica. Now they can use the camera footage to identify 
the thieves. The actual Brueghel is sitting in a vault in the 




Let ‘p’ = ‘the thieves have a painting by Brueghel’. According to TRUTH the 
thieves ought not to believe that p as it is false. But wouldn’t it be irrational 
for them not to believe it?3 Herein lies the problem. If that’s right, then 
there are cases in which TRUTH and RATIONALITY issue conflicting 
instructions.4 Sometimes TRUTH tells you not to believe that p even whilst 
RATIONALITY tells you to believe that p. But it’s logically impossible to both 
believe that p and not believe that p at the same time. Call any case in 
which TRUTH and RATIONALITY conflict a ‘conflict case’. The puzzle is: what 






My view – dilemmism – is that TRUTH and RATIONALITY both express 
requirements. You’re required to believe that p in conflict cases, and at the 
same time required not to believe that p.5 And that’s that. Neither 
requirement outweighs or takes priority over the other, and we cannot 
resolve the conflict by appealing to the idea that there are different senses 
of ‘ought’ at work or anything like that. Just as there are moral dilemmas, 
in which you fall short of living up to the demands of morality whatever 
you do, so too are there epistemic dilemmas.6 
 
That’s the dilemmic view in simple outline. Clearly, many details need to 
be filled in, and there’s also the matter of why we should prefer it to the 
 
3 Epistemologists who think there are only negative epistemic duties (e.g. Nelson 2010, 
Littlejohn 2013) will deny this. In Hughes (2019a, fc1, ms) I argue that they are mistaken. 
4 C.f. Hughes (2017, 2019a, 2019b) 
5 At first glance this might look like a logical contradiction. It isn’t. See Hughes (2019a, fc2). 
6 See Hughes (2019a) for a defence of this view. This paper elaborates and expands on some 
things I said there.  
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myriad possible alternatives. I won’t discuss any of that here. The point of 
this article isn’t to defend dilemmism. Its role here is only to serve as a test 
case for the idea that guidance considerations can help us decide between 
competing views about the fundamental norms of belief, and this outline 
will suffice for it to serve that role.  
 
A natural thought is that dilemmism must be rejected because it fails to 
give adequate guidance. In conflict cases, it says that you must believe that 
p and must not believe that p. This “guidance” looks completely useless. 
Furthermore, it’s plausible that if almost any (sane) view about the 
fundamental norms of belief could be dismissed on the grounds that it 
fails to give adequate guidance, dilemmism could be. This makes it the 
perfect test case. If it can be shown that guidance considerations don’t 
favour rejecting dilemmism then we can reasonably conclude that such 
considerations have at best a marginal role to play in theorising about the 
fundamental norms of belief. 
 
 
§IV. Motivating Norms and Perfect Guides 
 
 
So far, we have the intuitive thought that dilemmism fails to give adequate 
guidance. Call this the ‘guidance objection’. It needs to be sharpened up. 
What exactly is it about dilemmism that makes it inadequate as a guide?  
 
§4.1. Ignorance and Inability 
 
One obvious worry is that in conflict cases at least one of dilemmism’s 
demands is opaque to you. Think about the BRUEGHEL case. The thieves 
are not in a position to know that TRUTH requires them not to believe that 
p. When a normative theory allows for the possibility of circumstances in 
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which you are required to φ but not in a position to know it, it fails, in 
some intuitive sense, to be available as a guide. This suggests a condition 
on adequate guidance that dilemmism fails to satisfy. Call it 
TRANSPARENCY: 
 
TRANSPARENCY: A normative theory is adequately guiding only if, 
whenever it requires you to φ, you are in a position to know that 
it requires you to φ. 
 
Secondly, in conflict cases dilemmism gives you instructions it is 
manifestly impossible to follow. When a normative theory allows for the 
possibility that you can be required to φ even though you are clearly 
unable to φ, it is again in some intuitive sense not usable as a guide. This 
gives us a second condition on adequate guidance that dilemmism fails to 
satisfy. Call it ABILITY: 
 
ABILITY: A normative theory is adequately guiding only if, 
whenever it requires you to φ, you are able to φ. 
 
§4.2. Motivating Norms 
 
Is there a unified notion of guidance that connects these two seemingly 
disparate desiderata? There may be. Whatever else it takes for you to have 
been guided by a fact, that fact must surely have exerted some kind of 
influence on you. But not just any old kind of influence will do. The fact 
that he’s drunk might influence John’s behaviour by causing him to start 
a fight. But his decision to start the fight wasn’t guided by the fact that he 
was drunk – it was a reason why he started the fight, but it wasn’t his 
reason; his reason was the way the other guy looked at him. The contrast 
here is between explanatory reasons and motivating reasons: between 
facts that help to explain someone’s action, and facts that motivated them 
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to perform it. A natural thought is that a person’s action has been guided 
by the fact that p if, and only if, they act as they do at least in part because 
– that is to say, for the reason that – p, where the ‘because’ is understood 
as that of a motivating reason.7 It follows that your action has been guided 
by a norm’s requirement that you φ if and only if you act as you do in part 
because the norm requires you to φ. This sounds quite plausible. Levitical 
law prohibits consumption of any animal that ‘parts the hoof but does not 
chew the cud’.8 If you order the salmon rather than the pork, then you 
comply with this law. But you may be unaware of the law, or simply 
indifferent to it. Unless you order the salmon rather than the pork in part 
because Levitical law requires that of you, it is natural to think, your 
decision hasn’t been guided by the law. Your compliance is merely 
coincidental. 
 
Call this idea MOTIVATING NORMS: 
 
MOTIVATING NORMS: When a norm requires someone to φ, their 
behaviour is guided by the norm if and only if they act as they do 
at least in part because (i.e. for the reason that) the norm requires 
them to φ. 
 
MOTIVATING NORMS isn’t without problems, as we’ll see later. But it’s a 
good starting point, for as we’ll see shortly it provides us with a way of 





7 I say ‘in part’ because although we often talk of the reason why someone did something, in 
reality a complete explanation will almost always make reference to a plurality of reasons. 
8 I borrow this example from Smith (2012) 
 
 9 
§4.3. Perfect Guides 
 
As it stands, MOTIVATING NORMS is schematic. How we flesh it out will 
depend on how we think about motivating reasons. So far, we have 
assumed ‘factualism’: the view that worldly facts can be our motivating 
reasons.9 Some philosophers think that it is not worldly facts that are our 
motivating reasons, but rather the contents of our beliefs – i.e. 
propositions.10 Another view – psychologism – maintains that they are our 
psychological states themselves.11 We need not concern ourselves with this 
debate yet. I’ll assume a factualist interpretation of MOTIVATING NORMS for 
now. Later on, we’ll look at non-factualist interpretations of it. In the 
meantime, following on from MOTIVATING NORMS, let’s call ‘PERFECT 
GUIDES’ the idea that a normative theory is adequately guiding if and only 
if, whenever it requires you to φ, you are able to φ for the reason that you 
are required to φ: 
 
PERFECT GUIDES: A normative theory is adequately guiding if and 
only if, whenever it requires you to φ, you are able to φ for the 
reason that it requires you to φ. 
 
Why ‘PERFECT’ GUIDES? Because the claim is that a normative theory is 
adequately guiding only if, whenever it requires you to φ, you can φ for the 
reason that you are required to φ. We’ll see soon why this is important.12 
 
9 Factualists include Alverez (2010) and Hyman (2015). 
10 For example, Comesana & McGrath (2014). I’ll assume here, since nothing turns on it, that 
a fact is a true proposition. ‘Propositionalists’ about motivating reasons think that false 
propositions can also be our motivating reasons. 
11 E.g. Davidson (1963)  
12 PERFECT GUIDES doesn’t quite flow naturally from MOTIVATING NORMS. MOTIVATING NORMS 
says that your actions have been guided by a requirement to φ iff you act as you do in part 
because you’re required to φ. But it doesn’t specify that the action in question must be φ-ing 




PERFECT GUIDES looks fairly plausible at first glance, and there are good 
reasons to think that it entails both TRANSPARENCY and ABILITY. A 
compelling case can be made for the claim that the fact that p can be one’s 
reason for φ-ing only if one knows that p. Let’s call this HYMAN’S THESIS, 
since it’s most closely associated with John Hyman (1999, 2015): 
 
HYMAN’S THESIS: The fact that p can be one’s reason for φ-ing only 
if one knows that p.  
 
Why accept HYMAN’S THESIS? Here is a variation on the argument Hyman 
gives. Once, at a house party, I went to go into a bedroom. On opening the 
door, I saw a panther lying on the bed. I nearly jumped out of my skin and 
immediately slammed the door shut. After taking a few seconds to gather 
myself I realised that of course there couldn’t really be a panther in the 
room. This was urban England, not rural Indonesia. It must be a life-sized 
stuffed toy. Why did I slam the door? It wasn’t because there was a 
panther in the room, since there wasn’t. No true explanation has a false 
explanans. A better explanation is that it was because I believed there was 
a panther in the room. Now suppose instead (and here we depart from 
actual events) that in addition to the toy panther on the bed, unbeknownst 
to me there really was a panther in the room, hidden from view, lying 
under the bed. It should be obvious that this makes no explanatory 
difference. I still didn’t slam the door because there was a panther in the 
room, but rather because I believed that there was. And yet my belief was 
both true and (let’s imagine) rational. So why couldn’t the fact that there 
was a panther in the room be the reason why I slammed the door? Hyman 
maintains (and I agree) that the most plausible answer is because I didn’t 
 
this point that guidance considerations don’t motivate ABILITY. I think they’re right, but I 
won’t press the matter here since my concerns with PERFECT GUIDES and ABILITY, to be 
presented shortly, are independent of this point.  
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know that there was a panther in the room. If that’s right, what best 
explains it? Answer: HYMAN’S THESIS.13 
 
If HYMAN’S THESIS is right, then PERFECT GUIDES entails TRANSPARENCY. And 
ABILITY is straightforward: you can’t φ for the reason that p if you can’t φ. 
 
This adds some substance to the guidance objection; we now have more 
than just an intuition. Furthermore, it’s clear that if PERFECT GUIDES is right, 
then dilemmism fails to give adequate guidance. So, do we have a good 
reason to reject dilemmism here? 
 
 
§V. Imperfect Guides 
 
 
We do not. PERFECT GUIDES is too strong. Neither of TRANSPARENCY or 
ABILITY are genuine conditions on adequate guidance. 
 
§5.1. On TRANSPARENCY 
 
The problem with TRANSPARENCY it is that there are a variety of reasons, 
both theoretical and empirical, to think that no non-trivial condition is 
such that, whenever it obtains, one is in a position to know that it obtains 
(in other words, no non-trivial condition is, as Timothy Williamson (2000) 
has put it, ‘luminous’).14 This applies to the condition being required to φ as 
much as it does to any other. It follows that no possible normative 
epistemology satisfies TRANSPARENCY. This is a familiar observation. As 
Amia Srinivasan (2015) points out, the sensible conclusion to draw from it 
 
13 I argued against the thesis in Hughes (2014). I have since changed my mind. 
14 For a survey of these reasons, see Srinivasan (2015). 
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isn’t that no normative epistemology is capable of giving adequate 
guidance, but rather that TRANSPARENCY is too strong.  
 
§5.2. On ABILITY 
 
What about ABILITY? A knock-on effect shows that it is also too strong. 
According to MOTIVATING NORMS you can only be guided in φ-ing by a 
requirement to φ if you are both able to φ and know that you’re required 
to φ. Think back to the Levitical law example. If you order the salmon 
rather than the pork, then you are certainly able to comply with the law, 
since actuality implies possibility. But if you are unaware of the law, then 
you’re not guided by it when you decide on the salmon. Again, your 
compliance is coincidental. Both of the ability and knowledge conditions 
must be met if you are to be guided by a requirement. If one is but the 
other isn’t, then it’s not as though you have somehow been partially 
guided by the requirement. You haven’t been guided by it at all. Recall, the 
thought behind ABILITY is that requirements must be guiding yet aren’t if 
you can’t comply with them. But as we’ve already seen, the limits of our 
knowledge guarantee that requirements sometimes aren’t guiding. In that 
case, there is simply no ground on which to maintain that you must always 
be able to comply with requirements lest they be incapable of guiding you. 
It’s too late, that ship has sailed. The upshot is that ABILITY is left 
unmotivated.15 
 
Ability comes in grades. φ-ing may be logically possible, but not 
metaphysically possible; metaphysically possible, but not nomologically 
possible…and so on. Dilemmism is committed to the claim that one can 
be required to do that which is logically impossible – the strongest grade 
of impossibility. One might think that the argument only shows that some 
 
15 See Hughes (2018a) for a more detailed version of this argument. 
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interpretations of ABILITY cannot be motivated by guidance 
considerations, but that would be a mistake. On the MOTIVATING NORMS 
schema, luminosity failure precludes guidance considerations from 
motivating even the least committal interpretation of ABILITY, according to 
which the kind of ability in question is that of bare logical possibility. If, 
due to ignorance, you cannot always be guided by the requirements that 
bind you, there is simply no guidance-related motivation even for saying 
that it must always be logically possible to satisfy those requirements. 
 
 
§VI. Degrees of Guidance 
 
 
If we interpret the claim that a normative epistemology must be 
adequately guiding along the lines of PERFECT GUIDES no normative 
epistemology gives adequate guidance. So it is no objection to dilemmism 
that it comes up short. A different approach is needed if we are to make 
sense of the guidance objection. There are two ways we can go at this 
point. We can try to weaken PERFECT GUIDES, or we can start looking at 
alternatives to MOTIVATING NORMS or the factualist interpretation of it. 
We’ll get to the second idea later. Before we do, I want to explore the first. 
 
PERFECT GUIDES says that a normative theory is adequately guiding only if, 
whenever it requires you to φ, you are able to φ for the reason that you 
are required to φ. So if there are any cases in which you are required to φ 
but cannot φ for that reason, the theory is inadequate. But the idea of 
adequate guidance need not be so stringent and simpleminded. We might 
instead view the relationship between theories and guidance as a matter 
of degrees. The thought would be that even if no normative theory is 
perfectly guiding – even if we can’t always be guided by its imperatives – 
the more often a theory can be used as a guide – the more frequently we 
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can be guided by its imperatives – the better. The idea isn’t that the more 
demands it makes, the better a normative theory is. Totalitarianism isn’t a 
theoretical virtue. Rather, it is that the more often one is in a position to be 
guided by the demands it does make, the better. Ceteris paribus, one 
normative theory is superior to another if we are more often in a position 
to be guided by the instructions issued by the former than we are the latter.  
 
However, as I will now argue, dilemmism doesn’t do worse than the 
alternatives when it comes to giving guidance. I realise that this may 
sound implausible, but hear me out. 
 
 
§VII. Ubiquitous Irrationality 
 
 
Firstly, it is important to appreciate that dilemmism isn’t only a view 
about conflict cases. Most of the time TRUTH and RATIONALITY don’t 
conflict with one another. When they concord, dilemmism says that you 
are required to comply with each. Such cases present no special difficulties 
when it comes to guidance.  
 
Secondly, guidance failures will be commonplace for any view that 
accepts TRUTH – the knowledge norm of belief, for instance. Of course, 
such views will usually not make logically impossible demands, but that 
is beside the point. Recall, if MOTIVATING NORMS is right, then in order to 
be guided by a norm on a particular occasion, one needs both to know 
what it requires of one and to be able to do what it requires. The fact that 
a non-dilemmic theory like the knowledge norm doesn’t have the 
additional property of demanding the impossible is irrelevant. Non-
dilemmic TRUTH-centric theories don’t do any better than dilemmism 




The more interesting question is theories that reject TRUTH but accept 
RATIONALITY, which those who press the guidance objection will 
presumably prefer. In a recent paper, Stewart Cohen and Juan Comesana 
(fc) consider a dilemmic view similar in some respects to mine. In response 
to it, they write that “…even if there are [epistemic dilemmas] it is 
implausible that they are as pervasive as this position would have it. [If 
this view is right] we collectively face epistemic dilemmas multiple times 
an hour” (fc: 13). This will likely resonate with those sympathetic to the 
guidance objection. Maybe we can tolerate dilemmas, and along with 
them guidance failures, if they are recherché anomalies – freak events in 
our epistemic lives. But if dilemmism is right, then they are utterly 
commonplace. In that case, the thought goes, the problem with dilemmism 
isn’t that if it’s right the norms of belief aren’t always available as guides, 
it’s that they are unavailable far too often. 
 
Popular opinion seems to be that RATIONALITY-centric views do much 
better here. Even if we are not always in a position to know what it 
requires of us, surely we’re in a much better position with respect to 
RATIONALITY than we are with respect to TRUTH? Cohen and Comesana 
seem to think so. In a telling passage, they describe the idea that everyone 
is irrational multiple times a day as ‘extremely radical’ (fc: 3). 
 
Popular opinion is understandable. Cases in which p is false but one is not 
in a position to know it are easy to imagine. Cases in which it is irrational 
for one to believe that p, but one is not in a position to know it are harder 
to imagine. Nevertheless, there are good reasons to think that popular 
opinion is mistaken. The impression that RATIONALITY-centric views do 
better when it comes to degrees of guidance depends, I will argue, on 
easily overlooked but false tacit assumptions about the nature and 
richness of our cognitive lives and about the scope of the fundamental 




Firstly, Cohen and Comesana are unduly optimistic about our rationality. 
Over the last fifty-years psychologists have uncovered a variety of biases 
in reasoning and doxastic attitude formation, retention, and revision, to 
which we are prone. For instance, we exhibit confirmation bias: a tendency 
to seek and accept at face value evidence that supports our beliefs whilst 
avoiding disconfirming evidence;16 we exhibit hindsight bias: when we 
know the outcome of an event, we judge it to be more probable on the 
evidence available before the outcome than we do when we are ignorant 
of the outcome;17 and we exhibit implicit bias: our judgements are 
unconsciously influenced by prejudices and stereotypes.18 When a belief 
is formed, retained, or revised under the influence of these biases it is, 
intuitively, not rational (at least, when the influence of the bias is 
sufficiently strong).19 And these are only three biases amongst many. The 
picture emerging from cognitive psychology is one in which epistemic 
irrationality is a pervasive feature of human cognition. 
 
Does it follow that guidance failures will be commonplace even for 
theories that reject TRUTH but accept RATIONALITY? Not straightforwardly. 
For suppose that most of the time when you irrationally form, retain, or 
revise a belief as a result of the influence of bias you are in a position to 
know that you are being irrational; you only need to turn your attention 
towards the matter and correct yourself. In that case, the fact that you are 
habitually irrational poses no threat to the idea that RATIONALITY is good 
at guiding you, or at least better than the alternatives.  
 
16 Lord (1979) et al. 
17 Roese & Vohs (2012) et al. 
18 Brownstein (2019) et al. 
19 See Hughes (fc3) for an argument to back up the intuition and for an explanation of why 





But is there any reason to think that a bias-infected belief reveals its 
pathology to your introspective gaze? If the answer is ‘no’, then you’re not 
in a position to know that RATIONALITY requires you not to hold the belief, 
at least not without further information and investigation. But it is highly 
doubtful that the answer is ‘yes’ – at least, not usually. A wealth of studies 
indicate that biases usually operate at a sub-personal level, with the result 
that they simply cannot be detected by introspection.20 As Timothy Wilson 
and Nancy Brekke (1994) put it: bad judgements, unlike bad food, don’t 
smell.   
 
This suggests that guidance failures will be commonplace even for 
RATIONALITY-centric views. But will they be as commonplace as they are 
for dilemmism? Reflection on the richness of our cognitive lives suggests 
that they will.  
 
According to our best theories of belief, for you to believe that p is for the 
proposition that p to play a certain role in your cognitive life. Very 
roughly, for it to be a proposition that you are disposed to take as a given 
in your reasoning and decision-making, amongst other things. So 
understood you have billions of beliefs, even on a very conservative 
estimate.21 Moreover, they are in a state of constant flux. Every second you 
spend walking down the street, thousands of them spin and shuffle. Of 
course, you will never consciously entertain any more than a tiny fraction 
 
20 See Wilson (2002) for an overview. 
21 This assumes that beliefs are countable, which is questionable. See Treanor (2013) for 
discussion. I will work with the assumption here, but nothing depends on it. Even if belief is 
better understood as having, say, a map-like structure, no theory of belief could reasonably 
deny that the map is extremely rich in detail. More generally, no theory of belief could 
reasonably deny that our cognitive lives exhibit the kind of richness that my argument 
assumes them to. 
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of them. Nevertheless, they are there in the background, constantly 
shifting as your experience of the world unfolds.22,23   
 
Epistemologists sometimes overlook this fact. It is striking that Cohen and 
Comesana worry about the possibility that we face epistemic dilemmas 
‘multiple’ times an hour. That’s an enormous understatement; if there are 
epistemic dilemmas, they are far, far more common than that. The 
important point for our purposes is that what goes for dilemmism here 
also goes for RATIONALITY. When we combine the fact that irrationality-
caused-by-bias is an ordinary feature of human cognition with the fact that 
we are massively prolific in our doxastic attitude formation, there is every 
reason to think that guidance failures are utterly pervasive even for 
RATIONALITY-centric views. But if so, then RATIONALITY-centric views do 
no better than the alternatives when it comes to giving guidance.24 
 
 
22 The notion of belief in play here is dispositional rather than occurrent. Some philosophers 
draw a distinction between dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe – Audi (1994), 
for instance. But even if one accepts that distinction, and even if one thinks that we have 
rather few dispositional beliefs (as opposed to dispositions to believe), this won’t make a 
difference for the argument. Dispositions can be rational or irrational, so everything I say 
here could be rephrased in terms of a rationality norm for dispositions to believe. 
23 The fact that most of our beliefs are produced automatically might suggest that 
MOTIVATING NORMS is a bad model for guidance. The worry is that most of the time we 
simply do not form or revise beliefs for the reason that TRUTH or RATIONALITY requires us to. 
There may be something to this idea, but we should be careful – perhaps merely being 
counterfactually sensitive to a norm is sufficient for one to count as having been guided by 
it on the MOTIVATING NORMS schema. In addition, we might think that TRUTH and 
RATIONALITY merely need to be available as guides for when we reflectively scrutinise beliefs 
we have already formed. In any case, in §10.1 I will consider a way of thinking about 
guidance that takes this concern into account.  
24 The problem is not that some instances of irrationality will inevitably slip through the net, 
since it is impossible for us to monitor the entire corpus of our beliefs at once. Rather, it is 
that even when turn our attention to individual beliefs for inspection, we are often unable to 
identify those that are irrational, since our biases are not usually introspectively accessible. 
Thanks to Jonathan Way for pointing out the need for clarification here. 
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Proponents of RATIONALITY-centric views might respond by conceding 
that guidance failures are commonplace for RATIONALITY-centric views but 
maintain that they are not as commonplace as they are for dilemmism and 
that this is a reason to prefer the former theories to the latter. I want to say 
two things in response. Firstly, even if the frequency of guidance failures 
is greater for the dilemmist than it is for the RATIONALITY-centric theorist, 
we must ask whether this is a difference that makes a difference. We must 
also ask how this measurement will be made. At the very least, there surely 
needs to be not just a difference but a significant difference in the frequency 
of occasions on which the norms of belief are, or are not, available as 
guides according to competing theories for us to have a reason to prefer 
one theory over another. But whatever the difference in frequencies turns 
out to be, it is doubtful whether it is enough to justify adopting a 
RATIONALITY-centric theory over dilemmism. At the end of the day, once 
we appreciate how prolific we are in doxastic attitude formation, it 
becomes apparent that guidance failures will be ubiquitous come what 
may – it is no less normal for RATIONALITY-centric theories to fail to be 
available as guides than it is for TRUTH-centric theories and dilemmism. It 
is this fact, I suggest, rather than hard-to-establish relative frequencies, 
that should guide us in theory choice. 
 
Secondly, although they are useful (they make things vivid), strictly 
speaking we don’t need the empirical results from psychology to make the 
point here. Once we appreciate why this is, we can see that the idea that 
RATIONALITY-centric views are more often available as guides in any 
significant sense is incredibly hard to sustain.  
 
Why don’t we need the empirical results? Because we should expect the 
fundamental norms of belief, whatever they are, to exhibit a very high 
level of generality. They should apply to all agents in all possible 
situations. This is something all parties in the debate should agree on. It is 
difficult to see how exotic modally remote worlds populated by envatted 
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agents, evil epistemic demons, Boltzmann brains, philosophical zombies, 
infallible oracles, and the like could tell us anything about the 
fundamental norms were they only intended to apply locally, in the actual 
world.  These worlds, being modally remote, would simply be irrelevant 
to the question of what we should believe. Yet, epistemologists who 
theorise about the fundamental norms do not treat them as irrelevant; they 
go to great lengths to accommodate them, and with good reason. Some 
norms – ‘don’t believe what they tell you on Fox News’, ‘trust your doctor’ 
– are local, applying only given contingent features of the actual world. 
They don’t hold in worlds in which Fox News is known to be reliable and 
doctors are known to be unreliable. But norms like ‘believe only truths’ 
and ‘be rational’ surely aren’t like that. The fact that these norms are 
pitched at a very high level of generality means that we can run the 
argument using merely possible biased agents.    
 
With this in mind, consider Blixa. I will stipulate two facts about him. The 
first is that he is highly prone to all manner of cognitive biases. The second 
is that he has no introspective access to the influence of these biases. When 
he reflects on his biased beliefs, they look just fine to him, and not because 
he isn’t looking hard enough. 
 
In all probability, Blixa is an actual person. But even if not, he is a possible 
person. Nothing I have stipulated about him is incompatible with what we 
know about the human mind. That our judgements can be influenced by 
introspectively inaccessible sub-personal processes is as well-established 
as any thesis in psychology. Moreover, the fundamental norms of belief 
apply to Blixa as much as they do to us. There may be a limit on how 
poorly a mind can function whilst the person in possession of it remains 
an agent, and so one to whom the fundamental norms of belief apply, but 
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it is hard to see why anyone would think that Blixa is beyond the pale. He 
isn’t a mere animal, he’s just an idiot.25 
 
How will Blixa fare when it comes to being guided by the RATIONALITY 
norm? Not at all well. Occasions on which Blixa is unable to be guided by 
the norm because he’s not in a position to know what it requires of him 
will be very common indeed. Blixa isn’t in any better a position with 
respect to RATIONALITY than he is with respect to TRUTH when it comes to 
guidance. And remember: Blixa is only one possible person. We can 
imagine infinitely many others just like him. 
 
Can fans of guidance considerations legitimately ignore or discount Blixa 
and his kin when comparing dilemmism, TRUTH-centric, and RATIONALITY-
centric theories on degrees-of-guidance-giving? Given the level of 
generality that these norms are supposed to apply at, it is hard to see how 
they can. But if they can’t, then it should be clear that the prospects of 
vindicating a RATIONALITY-centric theory by appealing to degrees-of-
guidance-giving are utterly hopeless. Once we recognise that we must 
take into account, not just more-or-less-normal agents in the actual world, 
but also a vast number of possible agents in a vast plurality of possible 
worlds, the claim that RATIONALITY is significantly more frequently 
available as a guide than TRUTH or dilemmism looks like a total non-
starter. It becomes hard to even make sense of the idea that RATIONALITY-
centric views could be more frequently available as a guide than their 
rivals. One struggles to see how such a measurement could be made in the 
first place, even in principle.26 
 
 
25 It might be claimed that although the RATIONALITY norm still applies to Blixa, it makes 
different demands of him than it does of us. I see no reason to think this is true unless one 
accepts a view (‘blame-and-control epistemology’) which I will argue against shortly. 
26 Of course, we will also take into account worlds populated by super-rational agents with 




§VIII. Interlude: Three Concerns Addressed 
 
 
Before we continue, I want to address three potential concerns one might 
have about the argument so far. If you’re already on board, you can skip 
straight to §9. 
 
§8.1. Blame-and-Control Epistemology 
 
First, in light of the above, those who feel the pull of the intuition that 
RATIONALITY simply must be guiding (to a certain degree) might argue that 
biased beliefs are in fact rational. However, at this point it is reasonable to 
ask: if rationality does not even require one not to be biased, what does it 
require? And why should we think that it is an interesting normative 
notion at all? As I see it, it is a desideratum on a theory of epistemic 
rationality that it delivers the result that the kinds of biased beliefs under 
discussion are irrational. If a theory doesn’t do so, so much the worse for 
the theory.27 Unlike with the false beliefs of an envatted agent, which are 
the product of a well-functioning mind placed in an uncooperative 
environment – and hence rational, even though false – there isn’t anything 
epistemically positive to say about bias-infected beliefs. As such, it is hard 
 
27 Internalists sometimes give theoretical significance to how things seem or appear to agents 
(e.g. Huemer 2001, Smithies 2019). They risk facing what I have elsewhere called the 
‘problem of laundered biases’ (Hughes fc3). Does it seem or appear that p to an agent whose 
belief that p has a biased etiology? If the answer is ‘yes’, then insofar as these internalists take 
seemings and appearances to be evidence, they will have to say that seemings and 
appearances produced by biases are nonetheless good evidence. This is not an attractive 
thing to have to say (C.f. Siegel 2017). But if the answer is ‘no’, then given the ubiquity of 
bias-infected beliefs, seemings and appearances must not be things we have particularly 
good epistemic access to. This would make them ill-suited to play the role that internalists 
want them to play. 
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not to suspect that those who still maintain at this point that we must not 
yet have found the right theory of rationality are driven by a picture of 
rationality according to which an irrational belief is necessarily a belief 
that one can be appropriately blamed for holding. Since bias-infected 
beliefs are the product of introspectively inaccessible sub-personal 
processes over which we have little control, it is natural to think that we 
are, in some sense, not to blame for them. This impression is liable to 
strengthen when we realise that everyone harbours them and will 
continue to do so no matter how hard they try.  
 
However, there are reasons to be dissatisfied with a blame-and-control 
epistemology. Here I will mention two. Firstly, consider monothematic 
delusions. People with Capgras delusion believe that a loved-one has been 
replaced by an identical-looking imposter and produce elaborate 
confabulations to explain away evidence to the contrary. They are not to 
blame for their beliefs, yet it is perfectly clear that they are profoundly 
irrational. There is more to rationality than mere blamelessness. If so, there 
is no motivation for rejecting the idea that unconscious biases can affect 
the rationality of belief on the grounds that we are blameless for 
harbouring the beliefs that result from them. Secondly, the conditions 
under which it is appropriate to blame a person for their behaviour, 
including their epistemic behaviour, are a motley bunch, and are highly 
sensitive to facts about the person’s individual circumstances. This 
includes both their general circumstances (their upbringing, education, 
and intelligence, for instance) and their immediate circumstances (are they 
stressed, anxious, tired, distracted, etc.?).28 Any normative epistemology 
that tries to take account of all such considerations in order to deliver the 
result that one can never blamelessly violate a genuine a epistemic norm 
will almost certainly find it impossible to say anything very general about 
epistemic normativity. For this reason, a blame-and-control epistemology 
 
28 Austin (1957) and Littlejohn (fc) make a similar point about excusing conditions. 
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should be especially unappealing to those who endorse the MOTIVATING 
NORMS conception of guidance and think that it is important that our 
normative epistemology is available as a useful, usable, guide. The 
resulting epistemology, being hyper-sensitive to circumstantial 
fluctuations, will either have no principles at all, or principles so complex 
that no normal human being could possibly apply them. Either way, the 
result for a MOTIVATING NORMS conception of guidance will be the same: 




The second concern is about a potential overgeneralisation. It has seemed 
plausible to many philosophers that moral and prudential normative 
theories must be action-guiding. Do my arguments so far carry over to 
show that they aren’t? If they do, one might think that this is more radical 
a conclusion than is the conclusion that normative epistemologies need 
not be guiding. The worry is that it is too radical.29 
 
In reply, I would like to say several things. Firstly, we are currently 
considering a demanding conception of what it takes for a theory to be a 
useful guide. Later I will consider less demanding interpretations of the 
idea. I’ll argue that they don’t cause problems for dilemmism, not because 
we are in a bad state with regards to them no matter what normative 
epistemology we adopt, but rather because they are compatible with 
dilemmism counting as giving useful guidance even in conflict cases. One 
might think that morality and prudence must be action-guiding, but be 
untroubled by my arguments so far, because one has a liberal conception 
 
29 Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to think about this. 
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of guidance. I have no objection to this.30 So there is only a potential 
problem here if we think that the norms of morality and prudence must 
be guiding in the demanding ways I have discussed so far (for instance, 
that they must satisfy TRANSPARENCY and ABILITY). 
 
Now, insofar as one does accept a demanding conception of guidance, it 
may well be that my arguments carry over to challenge the idea that 
morality and prudence must be guiding.31 One reason to think so is the 
fact that, whilst moral and prudential norms dictate how we should act 
rather than what we should believe, how we act depends on what we 
believe. So anyone who violates epistemic norms on belief-formation is in 
jeopardy of violating moral and prudential norms as a result. If so, the 
possibility that no moral or prudential theory can satisfy stringent 
demands on guidance-giving is something we may simply have to learn 
to live with, radical though it may be.32  
 
30 Though I doubt that liberal conceptions of guidance will help us choose between 
competing moral and prudential theories, just as (I will argue) they cannot help us to choose 
between competing normative epistemologies. 
31 Elsewhere (Hughes 2018a, 2018b) I have argued that guidance considerations cannot be 
used to motivate the claim that the moral ‘ought’ implies ‘can’.  
32 However, it would be a mistake to suppose that this is a more radical conclusion than is the 
conclusion that normative epistemologies cannot satisfy stringent demands on guidance-
giving. Why might one suppose that it is more radical? The best reason I can think of is idea 
that conforming with moral and prudential norms is somehow more important than is 
conforming with epistemic norms. It is easy to see the appeal of this idea. It’s natural to think 
that if you fail to conform with epistemic norms, the worst that will happen is that you’ll end 
up with bad beliefs. By contrast, if you fail to conform with moral and prudential norms, you 
risk doing harm to yourself and others, which seems worse. Hence, the reasoning goes, it’s 
more important to conform to moral and prudential norms than it is to conform with 
epistemic norms, and so more important that they give use useful guidance. However, this 
reasoning is flawed. It ignores the connection between belief and action just mentioned; how 
we act depends on what we believe. If a person who violates epistemic norms is ipso facto in 
jeopardy of violating moral and prudential norms as a result, then adhering to epistemic 
norms is a precondition on reliably adhering to moral and prudential norms. As such, it is 




That said, we shouldn’t be too quick to draw this conclusion. There may 
be a difference between moral and prudential norms, on the one hand, and 
epistemic norms, on the other, when it comes to guidance. As I have 
emphasised, part of the problem when it comes to epistemic norms has to 
do with how enormously prolific we are in doxastic attitude formation. By 
contrast, the number of (non-doxastic) morally and prudentially 
significant actions we are able to perform is comparatively small. 
Thousands of my beliefs can change in an instant. But I can’t perform 
thousands of actions in an instant. This observation might be used to argue 
that guidance failures are less commonplace for moral and prudential 
norms than they are for epistemic norms, and that this difference means 
that we can use guidance considerations to choose between competing 
moral and prudential theories, even if we can’t use them to choose 
between competing epistemologies. Now, I’m skeptical about the 
prospects this argument, but I can’t rule it out here. Doing so would 
require a lengthy detour into competing theories of morality and 
prudence, which would take us too far afield. It remains a possibility, then. 
 
§8.3. Specific Ability vs. General Ability 
 
Some philosophers (Mele 2002, Way and Whiting 2016) draw a distinction 
between having a specific ability to φ and having a general ability to φ. 
Roughly, one has the specific ability to φ only if one can φ in present 
circumstances, whereas one can have a general ability to φ even if one 
doesn’t have the ability to φ in present circumstances. For example, 
basketball superstar LeBron James has the ability to dunk on a regulation 
NBA hoop. This is true even when he is on an airplane with no ball, no 
hoop, and no room to jump. When he is on an airplane, he lacks the 
specific ability to dunk, but retains the general ability. When he is on the 




The argument so far shows that we often lack the specific ability to be 
guided by norms like TRUTH and RATIONALITY, owing to ignorance, 
luminosity failure, and bias. But this does not show that we lack the 
general ability to be guided by them. Why is that? Well, when you know 
what TRUTH and RATIONALITY require of you, they are useful guides. By 
contrast, one might think that dilemmism isn’t a useful guide even when 
you know what it demands of you, since it gives you impossible-to-follow 
instructions in conflict cases. Doesn’t this show that guidance 
considerations can be used to rule it after all?33 
 
It does not. First, we should note that, as I said earlier, dilemmism isn’t 
only a view about conflict cases. Most of the time TRUTH and RATIONALITY 
don’t conflict. When they concord, you have the general ability to be 
guided by dilemmism’s demands just as much as you have the general 
ability to be guided by non-dilemmic epistemologies that endorse one of 
TRUTH or RATIONALITY. But, what about cases where you know what 
TRUTH and RATIONALITY require of you and they do conflict, giving rise to 
impossible-to-follow instructions? Aren’t these cases a problem? No. The 
reason is simple: such case can never arise in the first place. When you 
know what both of TRUTH and RATIONALITY require of you, they do not 
issue conflicting demands. After all, if you know that p is true, you can’t 
also know that it would be irrational for you not to believe that p. (And 
likewise, if you know that p is false, you can’t also know that you’re 
rationally required to believe that p). So, appealing to the distinction 
between specific and general abilities doesn’t give us a guidance-related 








§IX. Guidance Without Factualism 
 
 
If we conceptualise guidance along the lines of a factualist reading of 
MOTIVATING NORMS, dilemmism does no worse at giving it than the 
alternatives. But there are a number of different ways of fleshing out 
MOTIVATING NORMS. Perhaps one of the alternatives tells against the view? 
In this section we’ll look at the options. I’ll argue that however we think 
about guidance within the MOTIVATING NORMS framework, dilemmism 




On the factualist interpretation, MOTIVATING NORMS is a demanding 
conception of guidance. One obvious worry has to do with how it 
interprets the claim that your action has been guided by a norm’s 
requirement that you φ only if you act for the reason that the norm 
requires you to φ. On the factualist interpretation, this entails that you are 
required to φ by the norm (there are no false facts). But it is not obvious 
that you need to respond to the actual requirements that a norm generates 
in order to count as having been guided by it. Take one of the thieves. In 
the BRUEGHEL case TRUTH requires him not to believe that the painting in 
their possession is a Brueghel. But that’s not how it looks from his point of 
view. He (presumably) believes that TRUTH permits him to believe that p. 
And had he not believed this, he wouldn’t have believed that p. Isn’t this 
enough for us to say that he has been guided by the TRUTH norm? 
 
This is an idea that proponents of propositionalism about motivating 
reasons could take up. They could say that when one forms a doxastic 
attitude because one believes that it is required or permitted by a norm, 
one’s reason for forming it is that the attitude is required by TRUTH. We 
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can also add, if we like, that the belief in question must be rational. Since, 
unlike factualists, propositionalists think that false propositions can be 
one’s motivating reasons, the fact that TRUTH actually requires the thief not 
to believe that p need not stand in the way of his having been guided by 
it. 
 
Notice, however, that regardless of how we fill in the details, the notion of 
guidance in play here is not one that can be used to argue against 
dilemmism. If this is what adequate guidance is, a person who believes 
that p in a conflict case may well have been guided by both TRUTH and 
RATIONALITY, even though they conflict with one another. After all, our 
thief may well believe – rationally believe – that RATIONALITY requires him 
to believe that they have a Brueghel and that TRUTH permits this belief. 
Dilemmism would turn out to be guiding in conflict cases after all. 
 
§9.2. Propositionalism Plus Truth 
 
The problem with this way of thinking about guidance, when it comes to 
raising an objection to dilemmism, is that it denies that one must actually 
be required to φ by a norm to have been guided by that norm.  What, then, 
about the idea that one has been guided by a norm in φ-ing if one believes 
that it requires one to φ and that belief is true, even if it is not knowledge? 
Again, we could add that the belief must also be rational.  
 
This might look more attractive to those who press the guidance objection. 
We can’t maintain that dilemmism gives useful guidance in conflict cases 
once a truth requirement is attached to the theory of guidance. The thief 
might rationally believe that RATIONALITY requires him to believe that p 
and that TRUTH permits it, but he’s wrong – TRUTH requires him not to 
believe that p. So according to this way of thinking about guidance, he 
hasn’t been guided by TRUTH. He might instead believe, correctly, that he 
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is required to believe that p and also required not to believe that p, but 
now ABILITY kicks in: it is manifestly impossible for him to do both of these 
things, and so it’s hard to see what he’s supposed to do with that 
information when it comes to deliberating about what to believe.  
 
Crucially, if we employ this notion of guidance appeals to the ubiquity of 
human ignorance and irrationality will not show that none of the 
alternatives does any better than dilemmism at giving guidance. Take a 
RATIONALITY-centric view. Even if you’re not in a position to know that 
RATIONALITY requires you to φ, it doesn’t follow that you’re not in a 
position to truly believe that it requires you to φ. And, unlike with the 
dilemmic view, your true beliefs about what a RATIONALITY-centric view 
requires you to do can serve as a helpful basis for deliberation about what 
to believe – whether, for example, to believe that p or not believe that p. 
This is because, in virtue of the fact that RATIONALITY-centric views 
disavow the possibility of dilemmas, your true beliefs about what a 
RATIONALITY-centric view requires you to do are guaranteed to point in a 
single direction: towards belief, suspension, or disbelief. 
 
This looks like a problem for the dilemmist. Ultimately, however, it’s hard 
to make sense of the idea that having a non-knowledgeable true belief 
about what it requires is sufficient for guidance by a norm but having a 
false belief about what it requires is not. According to this view, it is not 
facts about what a norm itself actually requires that guide us – HYMAN’S 
THESIS tells us this. Rather, it is propositions – the contents of our 
representations of norms and requirements. But insofar as it is plausible 
that the contents of these representations guide us, they do so irrespective 
of whether they correspond to reality. So if we accept that a true belief is 
sufficient for guidance, we must also accept that a false belief is. It would 
be ad hoc to insist otherwise.  But if a false belief is sufficient for guidance, 
then, as we have already seen, dilemmism turns out to be guiding after all, 
since a person in a conflict case may well believe that both TRUTH and 
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RATIONALITY speak in favour of believing that p. The upshot is that there 
is no coherent notion of guidance to be found here on which dilemmism 




Factualists and propositionalists agree on one thing: that it is not our 
psychological states themselves that are our motivating reasons. 
Proponents of psychologism disagree. They maintain that when one φ’s, 
one’s motivating reasons for φ-ing are, and could only ever be, one’s 
psychological states – usually one’s beliefs, desires and intentions. Does 
psychologism offer us a useful way of thinking about guidance? 
 
The answer, it seems to me, is that proponents of psychologism will have 
a hard time making sense of guidance within the MOTIVATING NORMS 
schema in the first place. The reason is simple: norms and requirements 
are not psychological states of agents. My belief that UK law requires me 
to drive on the left is a psychological state, but the legal requirement, by 
which I am bound, is not. Given this, proponents of psychologism will 
have to say that a requirement to φ generated by a norm (say, a 
requirement to believe that p, because it would be irrational not to) is not, 
and can never be, amongst the reasons for which you φ. You can never φ 
even in part because φ-ing is required by a norm. But in that case, it is rather 
hard to see how you could ever be guided by a norm or the requirements 
that it generates at all. Those who go in for the MOTIVATING NORMS schema 







§X. Guidance Without MOTIVATING NORMS 
 
 
In summary, if MOTIVATING NORMS is our model of normative guidance, 
then however we fill in the details dilemmism doesn’t do any better or 
worse than the alternatives when it comes to giving it. But maybe the 
MOTIVATING NORMS framework doesn’t capture the notion of guidance that 
those who press the guidance objection against dilemmism have in mind? 
Maybe there is a better way of thinking about guidance that really does 
show dilemmism to be a fatally flawed theory? Let’s look at some of the 
options. 
 
§10.1. Guiding Dispositions 
 
A worry one might have about MOTIVATING NORMS is that it 
overintellectualises the concept of guidance. You probably hardly ever 
think to yourself ‘it would be irrational for me not to believe that p, so I 
should believe that p’ prior to forming a belief. Nevertheless, provided 
that the belief-formation process is appropriately sensitive to a norm and 
the demands that it makes, it seems natural to say that you are guided by 
that norm.34  
 
One way to avoid this problem is to conceptualise guidance in terms of 
dispositions. Think about our thief again. He manifests a disposition to 
comply with TRUTH when he believes that the painting in their possession 
is a Brueghel – in normal circumstances he would only believe that they 
have a Brueghel if they actually do. His error can be explained by the fact 
that he is in abnormal circumstances. Given this, even though he doesn’t 
 
34 As I said earlier, I am not entirely convinced that MOTIVATING NORMS overintellectualises 
in this way. But I won’t press the issue here. 
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believe in accordance with TRUTH, isn’t it right to say that he has been 
guided by it when he believes what he does?  
 
This looks promising as a way of thinking about guidance, and it doesn’t 
require us to have formed higher-order beliefs in order to count as having 
been guided. But notice that, as with the non-factive propositionalist 
interpretation of MOTIVATING NORMS, regardless of how we fill in the 
details, the notion of guidance in play here is not one that can be used to 
argue against dilemmism. The reason is the same. If this is what adequate 
guidance is, a person who believes that p in a conflict case may well have 
been guided by both TRUTH and RATIONALITY, even though they conflict 
with one another.35 The proposal is, roughly, that a person’s action has 
been guided by a norm when it is the manifestation of a disposition to 
comply with the norm. Since the thief manifests a disposition to believe 
only truths, and to be rational, when he believes that they have a Brueghel, 
he has been guided by both norms according to this notion of guidance. 
But in that case, dilemmism is guidance-giving in conflict cases after all.36,37 
 
35 This way of thinking about guidance doesn’t motivate an ABILITY condition, since it does 
not say that one must do what one is actually required to do in order to count as having been 
guided. 
36 On the dispositionalist view, one might think that being rational just is a matter of being 
guided in the right way by TRUTH. I’m sympathetic (though I would replace TRUTH with the 
knowledge norm). But this doesn’t look like a reason to reject RATIONALITY. 
37 In a nuanced article on normative guidance, Peter Railton (2006) points that most of our 
norm-guided behaviour does not involve conscious, explicit, representation of the norms by 
which we are guided. Norms are usually, as he puts it, internalized. One way in which this 
can happen is when one manifests a disposition to comply with the relevant norm without 
consciously representing it. But it is not the only way – Railton describes several other 
possibilities. For instance, a norm can also guide by unconsciously framing the options one 
considers in decision-making. Railton is a liberal and a pluralist about guidance. Liberal, in 
the sense that he doesn’t insist on a demanding interpretation of the conditions under which 
one counts as having been guided by a norm (unlike, say, those who would go in for 
TRANSPARENCY or ABILITY). Pluralist, in the sense that he thinks there are multiple distinct 




There is, of course, a variation on this view according to which one has 
been guided by a norm just in case one successfully manifests a disposition 
to comply with it. However, there is no good argument from this view to 
the claim that we should reject dilemmism, because if we adopt it 
guidance failures will be commonplace for any view. The situation will be 
the same as with the factualist interpretation of MOTIVATING NORMS. 
 
§10.2. Constitutive & Procedural Norms 
 
It has seemed plausible to some philosophers that TRUTH is a constitutive 
norm of belief.38 That is, what makes a mental state a belief, rather than 
something else, is that it is governed by TRUTH. Kathrin Gluer and Asa 
Wikforss (2009, 2010, 2013) have argued against this idea on the grounds 
that TRUTH does not give useful guidance. Since dilemmism is committed 
to TRUTH, their argument, if it works, will torpedo dilemmism.39  
 
Gluer and Wikforss’s reasoning is different from the guidance-related 
arguments against TRUTH we’ve looked at so far. They reason that in order 
to be guided by TRUTH with respect to some proposition p, one must first 
form a belief as to whether the antecedent in the conditional ‘One ought: 
if p is false, not believe that p’ is true. For until one has formed a belief 
about the antecedent, one cannot apply the norm. But to form a belief 
about whether the antecedent is true just is to form a belief about whether 
 
sympathetic to much of what he says. However, there is no objection to dilemmism to be 
extracted from his observations – precisely because they are liberal and pluralistic. Everything 
he argues about guidance is compatible with dilemmism being guiding, even in conflict 
cases. (Thanks to an anonymous referee for encouraging me to think about Railton’s views).  
38 E.g. Boghossian (2003), Engel (2013). 
39 I take no stand on whether TRUTH is a constitutive norm of belief. But if Gluer and Wikforss’s 




p is true or false. Since what belief to form about the truth or falsity of p is 
precisely the question that TRUTH was supposed to give one guidance on 
in the first place, Gluer and Wikforss reason, TRUTH does not give useful 
guidance. And if it doesn’t give useful guidance, they argue, it is not a 
genuine norm of belief at all.  
 
This is not a convincing argument. As Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen (2013) has 
pointed out, it relies on a narrow and demanding conception of guidance, 
according to which one counts as having been guided by a norm only if 
one forms a belief about what it requires of one. But as we are beginning 
to see, it is quite unclear why we should be so restrictive in our 
understanding of guidance.40 Consider, for instance, the dispositionalist 
conception of guidance just discussed. It does not require one to form a 
belief about what TRUTH requires of one in order for TRUTH to have given 
guidance – it is enough that one manifests a truth-conducive disposition. 
Yet it certainly looks like a way of having been guided by TRUTH. Or 
consider the distinction, which is sometimes made, between ‘direct’ and 
‘indirect’ guidance. Even if one cannot be directly guided by TRUTH, it does 
not follow that one cannot be indirectly guided by it.41 How? By following 
‘procedural’ norms. As a candidate, consider, for instance, an evidentialist 
spin on RATIONALITY, according to which one ought to believe that p only 
if one’s evidence indicates that p is true. The fact that this norm requires 
that one believes that p only if one’s evidence indicates that it is true (rather 
than, say, pleasant to believe) shows that TRUTH is playing a guiding role 
 
40 It is also unclear why we should assume, as Gluer and Wikforss do, that if a would-be 
norm N doesn’t give useful guidance, it isn’t a genuine norm. They provide no argument for 
this assumption, but given what we’ve seen so far one would be forgiven for questioning it. 
Until we get an argument, Gluer and Wikforss will have provided us with no reason to reject 
TRUTH.  
41 Steglich-Petersen (2013), Boghossian (2003, 2008), Engel (2013), Wedgwood (2002, 2017)  
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when one attempts to conform with the evidentialist norm, albeit 
indirectly.42  
 
Gluer and Wikforss’s objection to TRUTH fails, then.43 Ipso facto, it fails to 
undermine dilemmism. However, there may be another objection in the 
vicinity. One might argue that since we cannot be directly guided by 
TRUTH, it cannot be a full-blooded requirement. Rather, it is at most merely 
an ideal (aim, goal, etc.) The only real requirement, one might think, is 
RATIONALITY.44 
 
This reasoning should be rejected. It assumes that if φ-ing is an or ideal, 
aim, or goal, it isn’t also a requirement. But counterexamples to that 
assumption are easy to find. The ideal for a building contractor is (let us 
suppose) to finish the job on time and on budget. This ideal cannot be 
‘directly’ pursued, if by that we mean that one does not need a (fallible) 
means to achieve the end. Yet for all that it may well be that the contractor 
is also required to finish the job on time and on budget. I see no guidance-
related reason for thinking that the situation is any different with TRUTH. 
 
§10.3. Guiding Ideals 
 
A more pressing concern for dilemmic views is that, in virtue of making 
logically impossible demands, they cannot even serve as guiding ideals or 
aims. Daniel Greco (2012) and Susanna Rinard (2018) deny the existence 
of epistemic dilemmas on these grounds. They argue like this. Let 
 
42 C.f. Steglich-Petersen (2013). 
43 Gluer and Wikforss reply to some of the points just discussed in their (2013) paper. I am 
not persuaded by their arguments, but there is no space to pursue the dialectic further here. 
44 Blanshard (1974), Feldman (2000). Something like this line of thought also seems to be at 
work in Engel (2013) and Wedgwood (2002, 2017). 
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‘epistemic flawlessness’ be the state of satisfying all of the epistemic 
requirements that bind one. Now consider: 
 
1. Epistemic flawlessness is an ideal which can guide our doxastic 
attitude formation by being something we can strive towards. 
 
2. If epistemic flawlessness is sometimes logically impossible, then 
it is not an ideal which can guide our doxastic attitude formation 
by being something we can strive towards. 
 
3. Therefore, epistemic flawlessness is never logically impossible. 
 
4. If there are epistemic dilemmas, then epistemic flawlessness is 
sometimes logically impossible. 
 
 5. Therefore, there are no epistemic dilemmas. 
 
The crucial thought is that whilst satisfying certain demands might be 
beyond our reach, due to physical, psychological, epistemic, or 
computational limitations, they can nevertheless guide our behaviour by 
serving as ideals. But when they are logically or metaphysically 
impossible to satisfy, they cannot guide us in this way. Greco gives an 
example. You cannot match Eliud Kipchoge’s record Marathon time. But 
you can nevertheless treat it as an ideal to strive towards, and, if you do, 
it can guide your training. But what could you do to get on your way to 
running faster than yourself? Similarly, what could you do that would be 
a step in the direction of both believing that p and not believing that p? 
Nothing you could do would ever get you any closer to reaching these 
‘ideals’. So they are not ideals. And if they are not ideals, then they are not 




This argument is also unpersuasive. Premise (1) is ambiguous. Once it is 
disambiguated, we can see that premise (2) is false on one reading and that 
the argument overgenerates on the other. Either way, it is not sound.  
 
Unpacked, (1) says that ‘satisfying all of the epistemic requirements that 
bind one is an ideal which can guide one’s doxastic attitude formation by 
being something one can strive towards’. The ‘all’ here is ambiguous 
between a collective reading and a distributive reading. On the collective 
reading, the idea is that we take the epistemic requirements as a whole, and 
the ideal of epistemic flawlessness is to satisfy all of them. One will 
inevitably fall short, of course, but one can strive to do better by satisfying 
more of them. On the distributive reading we don’t bundle up the 
requirements. Rather, we keep them separate, and for each requirement 
the ideal is that you satisfy it. On this reading, there are many ideals, not 
one. For each requirement, there is an ideal: satisfying that requirement.  
 
Let’s look at the collective reading of the argument first. On it, premise (2) 
is false. Even if it is logically impossible to satisfy all of the epistemic 
requirements that bind you, because some of them conflict with one 
another, it is possible to get closer to satisfying all of them. You will 
certainly fall short, but you can strive to do better and get closer by 
satisfying more of them. Let me explain.  
 
The dilemmic view says that you should believe only truths and that you 
should be rational. Most of the time these requirements are jointly 
satisfiable. Just because there are cases in which, through sheer bad luck, 
you find yourself in a situation in which the demands of TRUTH and 
RATIONALITY conflict with one another, that doesn’t mean you’re always 
in that position. Now, in those cases in which they conflict, it is not 
logically possible to do what is required of you. So, if you ever find 
yourself in a dilemma situation, you will not achieve epistemic 
flawlessness. But you get closer to it the more of the requirements you do 
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satisfy. In that case, epistemic flawlessness is an ideal that can guide your 
practice of doxastic attitude formation by being something you aspire to. 
Hence, premise (2) of the argument is false. Moreover, you can strive to 
avoid such conflict cases altogether by being judicious in your choice of 
epistemic sources. You’ll almost certainly fail to live up to the ideal on 
some occasions, but that doesn’t show that it is not an ideal towards which 
you can strive, and by which you can be guided. 
 
On the collective reading of the argument, then, it is simply not true to say 
that a normative epistemology which allows for dilemmas does not 
provide us with a guiding ideal toward which we can strive. That leaves 
us with the distributive reading of the argument. Here the thought is that 
there cannot be conflicting requirements because, in virtue of it being 
logically impossible to satisfy each of them, you cannot even begin to get 
closer to doing what is required of you. On this reading, the argument 
might be thought to cause a problem for dilemmism, since there really is 
nothing you can do to get closer to satisfying the requirement ‘believe that 
p and don’t believe that p’.  
 
However, read this way the argument overgenerates. Suppose that you’re 
either required to φ or required to not-φ but have no way of knowing 
which and no chance of finding out. Can you use the ideal ‘do what you’re 
required to do’ as a guide when making your decision about whether to φ 
or not-φ in this context? No. The most you can do is guess and hope you 
get it right. The requirement (whatever it happens to be) cannot be used 
by you as a guide to make your decision in any way whatsoever; you 
might as well flip a coin. But we already know from anti-luminosity 
considerations that this situation – one where you are either required to φ 
or required to not-φ but have no way of knowing which – is possible.45 
 
45 Jonathan Way has suggested to me that anti-luminosity considerations only show that you 
can be required to φ or not required to φ and have no way of knowing which. I disagree. 
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What’s the difference between this situation and a conflict case? It’s 
logically and metaphysically possible for you to do what’s required of 
you, of course – that’s a difference. But it isn’t a relevant difference. What’s 
important is that in this situation you cannot use the requirement that 
binds you as a guide to help you make you decision. As we might put it: 
an invisible ideal is not one that you can strive to satisfy. You might satisfy 
it by accident, of course – a case of fortuitous luck. But it can’t play the role 
of guiding your behaviour. The upshot is that we should reject the 
argument on its distributive reading. However we interpret it, then, the 
flawlessness argument does not undermine dilemmism. 
 
§10.4. Guiding Reasons 
 
We still don’t have a good guidance objection to dilemmism. Perhaps the 
problem is that we have focused on guidance by norms and the 
requirements on doxastic attitude formation that they generate. A 
different approach maintains that what should guide us is not doxastic 
requirements themselves, but rather the things that make it the case that we 
are required to adopt doxastic attitudes. The most popular way of 
developing this idea is within a factualist ‘reasons-first’ ideology.46 It is 
this approach that I will focus on here. According to this view, what you 
ought to do is determined by the balance of your reasons, and for a fact to 
 
Imagine a game in which you are required to move your piece one place forward if it is past 
4pm and required to not move your piece one place forward if it is not past 4pm. Now 
suppose that you have no way of checking the time. You are required to φ or required to not-
φ and you have no way of knowing which. Bernhard Salow has raised a different objection. 
The claim that you might as well flip a coin suggests that it can be equally probable on your 
evidence that you are required to φ as it is that you are required to not φ. One might think 
that anti-luminosity considerations don’t get us this strong a result. I disagree. Analogues to 
Williamson’s (2014) unmarked clock case can be constructed to demonstrate the possibility.   
46 See, for instance, Kiesewetter (2017) and Lord (2015, 2018). 
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be a reason for you to φ it must be able to guide you. Specifically, you 
must be able to φ for the reasons that make it the case that you ought to φ: 
 
REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS: What you ought to do is determined 
by the balance of your reasons 
 
REASONS GUIDE: You are able to φ for the reasons that make it the 
case that you ought to φ. 
 
The conjunction of REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS and REASONS GUIDE 
appears to motivate accepting RATIONALITY and rejecting TRUTH and (a 
fortiori) dilemmism. Why? Well, suppose for reductio that TRUTH is a 
genuine norm. If so, then given REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS the fact that 
p is false is a reason for you not to believe that p even when you don’t 
know that p is false. But this contravenes REASONS GUIDE. This is because, 
given HYMAN’S THESIS, REASONS GUIDE entails: 
 
FILTER: The fact that p is a reason for you to φ only if you know 
that p. 
 
Since you cannot refrain from believing that p for the reason that p is false 
when you’re not in a position to know that p is false, we must reject TRUTH, 
and hence dilemmism. Instead, we should accept RATIONALITY – being 
rational, the thought goes, is just a matter of correctly responding to your 
reasons 
 
Here’s the interesting thing. The reasoning here appears to be invulnerable 
to the arguments I have given so far, which trade on the observation that 
we often have poor epistemic access to facts about what’s required of us. 





1.  P is a reason for you to φ only if you know that p is a reason 
for you to φ 
 
2. P is a reason for you to φ only if you know that p.  
 
(1) is a luminosity principle, but (2) isn’t. The fact by which you are guided 
is that p, not that p is a reason to φ. As a result, it is unaffected by anti-
luminosity arguments. This approach bypasses worries about our poor 
epistemic access to the facts about what we should do by putting an 
epistemic filter in place according to which only the facts that we have 
access to make a difference to what we should do in the first place. 
 
But why think that for p to be a reason of you to φ, you must be able to φ 
for the reason that p? The answer given by fans of REASONS GUIDE is that 
unless we accept it, we will not be able to rule out cases in which the only 
way you can do what you ought to do is by acting irrationally and getting 
lucky. Call this idea NO FLUKES: 
 
NO FLUKES: It is always possible to do what you ought to do 
without having to act irrationally and getting lucky 
 
Think again about our thief. According to TRUTH he ought not to believe 
that they have a painting by Brueghel. But the only way he can conform 
with TRUTH is by brazenly and irrationally disregarding his evidence. This, 
the thought goes, is unacceptable. So, we should accept NO FLUKES, and NO 
FLUKES motivates REASONS GUIDE.47 
 
 
47 It is sometimes boldly claimed that REASONS GUIDE is a conceptual truth (this is how I read 
Kiesewetter 2017), but this claim keeps bad company. Philosophers have frequently said the 
same thing about requirements, and we’ve already seen that that isn’t true. 
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Does this shift of focus to guidance-by-reasons help us to decide between 
the fundamental norms? I don’t think it does. The problem is that even if 
we accept FILTER and REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS there will still be cases 
in which you can only do what you ought to by acting irrationally and 
getting lucky. NO FLUKES is false. But in that case, we have no motivation 
for REASONS GUIDE, and so no motivation for FILTER. And without FILTER, 
we have no argument for rejecting TRUTH and dilemmism.  
 
To see why there will still be cases in which one ought to φ yet cannot φ 
without acting irrationally and getting lucky even if we accept FILTER and 
REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS, consider the following two cases: 
 
RED TABLE: Grace is in room one. She sees a red table in front of her 
in normal lighting conditions and forms the belief that there is a 
red table in room one. 
 
WHITE TABLE: Bella is in room two. She sees what appears to be a 
red table in front of her but is in fact a white table made to look 
red by a hidden light source. She forms the belief that there is a 
red table in room two. 
 
Both beliefs are surely rational. Are they the beliefs Grace and Bella ought 
to have according to fans of the reasons-first approach? Given that they 
accept RATIONALITY and reject TRUTH one would expect the answer to be 
‘yes’. But in fact it seems to be ‘no’: Grace should believe that there is a red 
table in room one, but Bella should not believe that there is a red table in 
room two. Why? Remember that according to the view we are considering, 
what one ought to believe is determined by the balance of one’s reasons 
(REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS), and only known facts are reasons (FILTER). 
Grace knows that there is a red table in front of her and knows that she is 
in room one. So she has excellent reasons to believe that there’s a red table 
in room one. Bella isn’t so fortunate. She knows that she’s in room two, 
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but she doesn’t know that there’s a red table in front of her, since there 
isn’t – the table is white. So it doesn’t look like she has good reasons to 
believe that there is a red table in room two. And since what she should 
believe is determined by her reasons, it looks like she shouldn’t believe 
that there is a table in room two.  
 
Now, ask yourself: is it possible for Bella to do what she ought to without 
being irrational and getting lucky? Pretty clearly not. She’d be completely 
irrational to suspend on or disbelieve the proposition that there is a red 
table in room two. But in that case WHITE TABLE is a counterexample to NO 
FLUKES. And since REASONS GUIDE depends on NO FLUKES, we have no 
reason to accept REASONS GUIDE. 
 
Proponents of REASONS GUIDE are aware of this problem. In response, they 
point out that it appears to Bella that the table is red, and that this is 
something that she presumably knows (or at least, is in a position to 
know).48 They then argue that this fact – the fact that it appears to Bella 
that there is a red table in front of her – is a reason for her to believe that 
there is a red table in room two. Moreover, this reason carries substantial 
weight. Enough to make it the case that on the balance of reasons she 
ought to believe that there is a red table in room two. So in fact Bella ought 
to believe what it would be rational for her to believe. Moreover, she need 
not act irrationally and hope to get lucky in order to believe what she 
ought to. So, WHITE TABLE isn’t a counterexample to NO FLUKES after all. 
 
However, this reply doesn’t work. In order for it to work, the fact that it 
appears to one that p must always be as weighty a reason for one to believe 
that p as is the fact that p. For if it is not, then it will be possible to construct 
good-case/bad-case pairs analogous to RED TABLE & WHITE TABLE in which 
the subject in the bad case has less reason to believe that p than does the 
 
48 See, again, Kiesewetter (2017) and Lord (2018). 
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subject in the good case. In some of these cases, this difference in the 
weight of reasons will be enough to make it the case that the subject in the 
bad case ought not to believe that p, whilst the subject in the good case 
ought to believe that p. In these bad cases, the subject will be in the same 
position as Bella: the only way to do what she ought to do will be to act 
irrationally and get lucky. These cases would be counterexamples to NO 
FLUKES. 
 
The problem is that there is no reason to think that the fact that it appears 
that p is always as weighty a reason for one to believe that p as is the fact 
that p.49 Maria Lasonen-Aarnio (2019) makes the point especially clearly. 
If one knows that p and one knows that p entails q, then one has as strong 
a reason as there could be to believe that q: a reason that entails that q. By 
contrast, Lasonen-Aarnio notes, if one knows that p and one knows merely 
that p appears to entail q, then one does not have as strong a reason as there 
could be to believe that  q (i.e. an entailing reason) unless one can rule out 
the possibility that the appearance is misleading. Since appearances can 
be misleading, one cannot always rule out the possibility that an 
appearance that p is misleading. Thus, there are possible cases in which 
the fact that it appears that p is not as weighty a reason for one to believe 
that p as is the fact that p – WHITE TABLE is just such a case.50 
 
So, NO FLUKES is false. Where does this leave us? Without an argument for 
REASONS GUIDE, and so without a reason to accept FILTER, and so without a 
guidance-related objection to TRUTH or dilemmism. Conceptualising 
 
49 As several epistemologists have recently pointed out. See McHugh (2018), Littlejohn (2018), 
and Lasonen-Aarnio (2019). 
50 Lord’s (2018) response to this objection is to appeal to the concept of ‘relative weights’. I 
am not persuaded by it, but I cannot pursue the matter further here. 
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guidance in terms of reasons rather than norms and requirements doesn’t 
help those who would level the guidance objection against dilemmism.51 
 
Of course, the focus here has only been on a factualist implementation of 
the reasons-first programme. Not all adherents to the programme accept 
factualism. Some go in for propositionalism or psychologism.52 Could one 
of these approaches appeal to guidance considerations to rule out a view 
dilemmism in favour of a RATIONALITY-centric view? I am sceptical – I 
suspect that they will be unable to account for the irrationality of biased 
beliefs. However, there isn’t space to discuss the issue here, so instead I 
will leave the ball in their court. If a workable argument can be 






We’ve looked at a number of ways of filling in the details of the guidance 
objection. On none of them does it tell against dilemmism. We have not 
looked at every way of filling in the details. Nevertheless, I suggest that the 
conclusion to draw from the foregoing is that there is no good objection to 
dilemmism to be found from guidance considerations. 
 
But dilemmism was only a test case. Earlier I said that my goal was to show 
that guidance considerations have little role to play in helping us to decide 
between competing views about the fundamental norms of belief in 
 
51 Even if we reject REASONS GUIDE, we might accept FILTER and REASONS-DETERMINE-OUGHTS 
on other grounds. Will the resulting epistemology do better than dilemmism when it comes 
to degrees of guidance? I think not. I suspect it will be unable to avoid the problems discussed 
in §7. 
52 See Schroeder (2008) for propositionalism and Mantel (2018) for psychologism. 
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general. If guidance considerations can’t rule out dilemmism, what else 
can’t they do?  
 
§11.1. The Nature of the Fundamental Norms 
 
Clearly, they cannot rule out unabashedly externalist views like process 
reliabilism and the knowledge norm of belief. Equally clearly, they cannot 
rule out externalist versions of RATIONALITY-centric views (neither, of 
course, can they undermine internalist RATIONALITY-centric views).  
 
Nor will they help us to adjudicate between competing ways of thinking 
about rationality, such as evidentialism, normal-worlds reliabilism, 
‘normic support’ views, mentalism, and dispositionalism.53 If it is a 
desideratum on a theory of epistemic rationality that it marks bias-infected 
beliefs as irrational, then, depending on how we conceptualise guidance, 
guidance failures will either be ubiquitous whichever way we go with the 
theory of epistemic rationality, or every theory will easily be capable of 
giving guidance.  
 
Another result is that they cannot be used to choose between normative 
epistemologies according to which how one ought to conduct one’s 
doxastic life is constrained by limitations on how one is able to conduct it, 
and epistemologies that do not posit this constraint. This follows from the 




53 For evidentialism, see Conee and Feldman (2004); normal-worlds reliabilism: Goldman 
(1986); normic support: Smith (2016); mentalism: Conee & Feldman (2004) and Wedgwood 
(2002, 2017); dispositionalism: Lasonen-Aarnio (2010, fc.). What about access internalism? If 
the argument of §7 is correct, it is not a tenable position. 
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Yet another result is that they cannot be used to motivate thinking of some 
epistemic norms evaluatively, rather than deontically, as aims, goals, or 
ideals, rather than requirements. Those who are happy to endorse the idea 
that truth is an aim of belief (most epistemologists), but recoil at the idea 
that we are epistemically required to believe only truths (again, most 
epistemologists) will not find any support for their view from guidance 
considerations.  
 
Generalising, it is difficult to use guidance-giving as a criterion by which 
to choose between competing approaches to the fundamental norms of 
belief. 
 
So much for the fundamental norms. The point also generalises to other 
areas of normative epistemology. Which ones? A comprehensive answer 
to this question is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, here is a 
sample.  
 
§11.2. Evidence and Coherence 
 
Starting with our dilemmic theme, recently David Christensen (2010a, 
2010b, 2016), Alex Worsnip (2018, fc), and I (Hughes 2019b, fc1, fc2) have 
floated the idea that conflicts between substantive and structural norms of 
epistemic rationality should be thought of as dilemmas. One might have 
thought we should reject this idea on the grounds that the resulting 
epistemology would not be adequately guiding. But this would be a 
mistake. Instances of substantive rationality failing to give guidance are so 
commonplace anyway that there is nothing to be gained from cleaving to 





§11.3. Uniqueness and Permissivism 
 
There are also implications for the uniqueness versus permissivism 
debate. Proponents of uniqueness maintain that for any given body of 
evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude to take towards a 
proposition p given that evidence. Permissivists disagree. They maintain 
that sometimes more than one attitude is rationally permissible on a single 
body of evidence.54 A common argument against uniqueness and in 
favour of permissivism is that uniqueness is too demanding.55 If 
uniqueness was true, it would often be difficult to know what one is 
rationally required to believe. As a result, it would be difficult to conform 
with the demands of rationality. Why should this be an objection to the 
view? One obvious answer is that in virtue of making such exacting 
demands, epistemologies that endorse uniqueness fail to give us usable 
guidance.56 But the foregoing arguments show that this cannot ground the 
demandingness objection. A plausible permissivist epistemology must 
accept that unconsciously biased beliefs and credences are irrational. One 
consequence of this is that we will frequently fail to have the beliefs and 
credences that rationality requires, without having the ability to correct 
the problem, due to ignorance and an inability to control for such biases. 
Guidance failures will be ubiquitous even for the permissivist. As a result, 
it is highly doubtful that permissivists are in a better position than 
proponents of uniqueness when it comes to degrees-of-guidance. 
 
Permissivists might reply that theirs is a non-ideal epistemology: 
uniqueness may well be right for agents with god-like cognitive abilities – 
permissivism is for us, with all our cognitive imperfections and 
 
54 See Kopec & Titelbaum (2016) for an overview of this debate. 
55 E.g. Schoenfield (2014) 
56 Of course, this is not the only possible answer. 
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limitations. But this reply misses the mark – biased beliefs are irrational, 
even for non-ideal agents like us. 
 
§11.4. Bayesian Epistemology 
 
The same dialectic plays out when it comes to Bayesian epistemology. 
Bayesianism requires one’s credences to be probabilistically coherent. A 
common complaint is that this is unrealistically demanding.57 Amongst 
other things, it requires one to assign credence 1 to all logical truths and 
credence 0 to all logical falsehoods. A natural thought is that in virtue of 
making unrealistic demands, Bayesianism fails to give usable guidance. 
But this observation cannot ground the demandingness objection for the 
same reason that it cannot ground an argument against uniqueness. And 
as before, it is not open to anti-Bayesians to argue that they are offering a 
non-ideal epistemology. 
 
§11.5. Sharp and Mushy Credences 
 
The dialectic also plays out in the debate about sharp versus mushy 
credences. Some epistemologists argue that our credences should 
sometimes be mushy – they should be spread out over intervals of real 
numbers (e.g. [0.3–0.5]), rather than precise real numbers (e.g. 0.41111…).58 
One possible argument for mushy credences is the thought that an 
epistemology that requires sharp credences makes unrealistic demands. 
Guidance considerations cannot ground this argument, for the same 
reason as before. 
 
 
57 C.f. Titelbaum (ms). 
58 For an introduction to the debate, see Bradley (2019). 
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§11.6. What’s Going On? 
 
These conclusions might seem surprising. It is patently obvious that only 
highly idealised counterparts to ourselves could possibly live up to the 
standards set by Bayesianism, uniqueness, and sharpness. Shouldn’t this 
be taken into account when we construct our normative epistemology? No 
doubt it should. But the question is: on what grounds? I maintain that it 
cannot be on guidance grounds. Even when it comes to norms that don’t 
look obviously demanding, we are in a much worse position, guidance-
wise, than many epistemologists have (often tacitly) assumed. Once this 
fact is appreciated, the gap between norms that appear to be relatively 
undemanding and those that are obviously highly demanding shrinks 
dramatically. 
 
Why has this point been overlooked? Part of the explanation may have to 
do with the kinds of cases that epistemologists working on what I have 
called ‘the fundamental norms’ usually focus on. The typical vignette in 
this area of epistemology involves a person receiving a new piece of 
information, usually through testimony or visual perception, 
contemplating it, and forming a new belief or revising an existing belief as 
a consequence, often about an object in their immediate vicinity. The way 
these vignettes are presented encourages us to think of this as a somewhat 
extended and effortful process that takes place at the forefront of the 
person’s conscious mind. Moreover, they are designed to elicit a clear 
judgement about what rationality requires of the person. There is nothing 
wrong with the use of cases like these, of course, but they do tend to 
encourage a picture of our epistemic lives that is less rich, complex, and 
challenging than the reality (most of our beliefs are not about the colours 
of tables!) This focus may lead us to tacitly assume a more optimistic 
outlook on the prospects of being guided by a norm like RATIONALITY than 








I will close with some more positive remarks. Firstly, nothing I have 
argued here shows that guidance considerations should not play an 
important role in epistemologies which focus on local norms rather than 
very general norms like TRUTH and RATIONALITY. Secondly, consider 
TRUTH and RATIONALITY expressed in the conditional form ‘You ought: if 
in circumstances C, then φ’. A large part of the problem is that we are often 
not in a position to know whether the antecedents of the conditionals 
obtain. But this does not prevent us from knowing that the conditionals 
themselves are true. This knowledge can (and already does) serve as a 
useful guide in all kinds of ways. For instance, knowing that TRUTH and 
RATIONALITY are norms of belief, we should be motivated to avoid 
unreliable sources of evidence (compare §10.2). This is one of many ways 
of being guided by the most fundamental, general, epistemic norms that 
is easily available to everyone. But it is doubtful that this way of thinking 
about guidance can help us in theorising by narrowing down the range of 
acceptable fundamental norms. None of the views we have looked at is 
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